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Conference: “Derrida Today” (Sydney, July 10-12, 2008) 
Dr Maria O’Connor 
 
Some preliminary remarks: 
This is an abbreviation of what will become a published paper, perhaps, for the journal 
Derrida Today. And whilst I touch on some ideas from the work of Maurice Blanchot 
and Gregory Ulmer, these will not be covered in any great complexity now but rather will 
form, hopefully, more cogent analysis in the extended version of this paper. 
 
Indeed the orientation of this paper delivered today has shifted emphasis to the original 
intent. Let me read from my original abstract published in the Derrida Today programme 
to open up the differences and conceptual links to what I’m about to deliver: 
 
[ABSTRACT] 
The title of this paper was to be: 
Perennially Homeless: Deconstruction—a disciplined non-belonging 
 
In the context of the academy today, what is it to say that we belong in a perennial 
condition of translation? That is, a translation process across, and of course internal to, 
the borders of [its] disciplinary borders? Perhaps, our contemporary notion of inter or 
trans disciplinarity constitutes and, at the same moment testifies to, a desire for 
something more primordially akin to Heidegger’s homelessness. A homelessness, I’m 
cautious to add, that is “inherent” in the forces of deconstruction — here we would want 
to deconstruct notions of the filial and legacy.  
 
This paper desires to traverse a desire for (our) homelessness in relation to a constituted 
instituted notion of interdisciplinarity to reveal the trace of its (metaphysical) path. Our 
strategy here, via a deconstruction of sexual difference in relation to (some of) its 
contemporary disciplinary discourses, is to reveal a more originary question on the 
question of sexual difference today. Further we hope here to broaden a dialogue on the 
relevancy of deconstruction in the university today. 
 
 
In what you will here today this paper carries forward a notion of perennial homelessness 
into a radical questioning of belonging and identity explored via Heidegger located in his 
text Identity and Difference and furthers this relation to the notion of the proper or 
restricted economy that is housed within an academy’s disciplinary borders to a more 
primordial deconstructive question of ecriture in the general economy. [Perhaps, I/we — 
or Je-Nous — find proximity to what Stephen Barker in his paper yesterday suggested via 
Steigler’s neologism Default that finds proximity to Différance. For instance, Steigler’s 
Default, as Barker’s paper suggested, rejects any form of disciplinarity and rather chooses 
to name what he does as a hyper-philosophy – on the basis of his thinking of technics as 
the originary default or in Derrida’s terms the originary différance as an arche-writing. 
My connection here will be to link up grammatology as that technic if you like, as a way 
of approaching the question of concepts; thinking differences, and their proper place for 
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discoursing constitutive of laws invented in languages housed within disciplinary borders 
to the question of sexual difference].  
 
That is, this paper now takes up via Derrida’s text Spurs its deferment of the question of 
woman to style for an opening up of my question of sexual difference to a 
grammatological one. That is to say, if there is a discipline such as feminism that it would 
be a category of the system of the Book (in the capital B) as a totalized encounter. In this 
restricted economy the discipline of Derrida (and here I evoke a question of what might 
constitute this conference in its titular head) and to continue, the discipline of woman are 
both totalized and thereby lose the impropriety or contamination of what deconstruction 
and grammatology can bring as a question. 
 
 
[NEW PAPER FOR DERRIDA TODAY] 
The Question of Style Today: The Impossible Return 
(aka this (then) will not have been my text) 
 
“The joyful wisdom shows it well: there never has been the style, the simulacrum, 
the woman. There never has been the sexual difference. If the simulacrum is ever 
going to occur, its writing must be in the interval between several styles. And the 
insinuation of the woman (of) Nietzsche is that, if there is going to be style, there can 
only be more than one” (Jacques Derrida.  Spurs Nietzsche’s Styles: Éperons: Les 
Styles de Nietzsche, 139). 
 
The title for this paper was to have been Perennially Homeless—a disciplined non-
belonging. However—it is style that will be my subject. They might however, if one 
wonders, amount to the same thing—or is it to the other. 
 
You may have already recognized a debt in the opening lines to Jacques Derrida’s Spurs 
Nietzsche’s Styles as a text that deals with the question of style as a question of truth, 
woman and the proper. Derrida’s question of style is also a quotation, a debt also that he 
suggests in the opening pages to Spurs that serves to recognize and add to “a new phase 
in the process of deconstructive (i.e. affirmative) interpretation”. In my own 
appropriation of the this quote, this paper hopes in its revisitation to this phase or phrase 
to open up the question of style today. Spurs quotes itself whereby the question of style 
refers to a first version of this text, which was presented at the colloquium on Nietzsche 
held at Cerisy-la-Salle in July, 1972.1 Spurs initially came as a response by Derrida 
delivered in this 1972 symposium entitled “Nietzsche Today?” Derrida interpreted the 
second word of the title by choosing to speak on Nietzsche and women, “La «femme»—
le mot fait époque,” Derrida says in 1972. The French expression “faire époque,” 
translates in English as “marks an era.” The era marked by the word “woman” was the 
“today” in which Derrida speaks. Jane Gallop suggests in Derrida and Feminism: 
Recasting the Question of Woman: “like the feminism with which it was contemporary, 
                                                
1 It is also quoting the authors of works that raise the question of style initially as an opening onto 
contemporary spaces for deconstruction. Spurs refers to these authors in a footnote by way of 
acknowledging where he has appropriated this quote from. “The «authors» of these works (Sarah Kofman, 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Bernard Pautrat, Jean-Michel Rey) were present at that lecture” (147). 
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Spurs belongs [italics mine MOC] to the era [1970s feminism] of ‘woman’.”2 Certainly 
Gallop’s paper engages with the question of the plurality of “women” as a way of shifting 
(her) perception(s) of a universalized and dated pre-suppositional thinking proffered by 
the singular “woman” of Spurs. However, my response does not entirely accord with the 
responses to Spurs by feminisms of the 70s, 80s, 90s that can be gauged via a text like 
Derrida & Feminism which has taken into consideration the “critique, correctness and 
seductions” perceived by Gallop et al as Spurs’ offering to feminism.  
 
The question here that arises through a question of an era, woman and style is situated by 
Deconstruction on the question of the proper and its others. In taking up the challenge of 
speaking on the relevancy of Derrida today I have returned, as this conference title has 
clearly hinted at, to a question of belonging and the proper that is so poetically driven in 
Spurs. In fact, as I have pointed to, it is the question of style and its question of belonging 
in the context of the academy that is most pressing for my conception of “today”. It is a 
question that has been recently posed by others (Simon Critchley, Gregory Ulmer for 
instance) that it may be time to give grammatology another look in terms of its key 
importance to Derrida’s project and the ongoing relevancy it has for writing otherwise: 
To an otherwise to the law of the proper of, for instance the academy, in a move toward a 
general economy rather than a restricted economy that would house the proper of 
writings many laws of genre etc. That is, grammatologically-framed Spurs can be read as 
a question of style that activates a radical inscription that for us offers a contestation to 
those modes of academic writing that have been modeled on classical models of thought, 
to logocentric paradigms of thought. Whilst this may not be an explicit intention stated in 
Spurs as a text where Derrida signs Nietzsche’s styles, or other experimental texts by 
Derrida, certainly there have been those who have signed the work as such. For example, 
concerning Glas Gregory Ulmer suggests:  
 
 Glas is not composed in the conventional manner of the academic book 
because it is explicitly an anti-book, written as an alternative to the 
classical model of the book. Derrida has argued in Of Grammatology and 
elsewhere that the Book as such reflects a certain model of thought based 
on Platonic, and ultimately logocentric, paradigm of thought, one with 
which the restriction of writing to communication is consistent.3  
 
Ulmer’s essay is addressed to those interested in “testing the replicability, the scientific 
value, of this experiment in a new academic writing.”4 Initially Spurs attached itself to my 
signature for precisely how it demonstrated sexual differences across regions of style or 
genre and here genre and gender interlace an otherwise discourse; a desire that speaks a 
Blanchotian nothing or radical absence in language and culture, to the traditional 
academic model of disciplinarity.  
 
                                                
2  Jane Gallop, “’Women’ in Spurs and Nineties Feminism,” in Derrida and Feminism: Recasting the 
Question of Woman, ed. by Ellen K. Feder, Mary C. Rawlinson and Emily Zakin (New York & London: 
Routledge, 1997) pp. 7-20; p. 7. 
3  Ulmer, “Sounding the Unconscious,” in Glassary, op. cit. p. 29. 
4  Ibid., p. 23. 
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Similar to the opening themes of Derrida’s Of Grammatology the work of Maurice 
Blanchot, who will be returned to, suggests writing must pass through the Book. That is 
to say, occidental civilization is founded upon the Book as the condition of possibility for 
meaning, knowledge, totality, presence, memory, systematicity. It matters little which 
transcendental signified—God, the Subject, History, the Proletariat, the Nation, the 
American Family — is claimed as the origin of meaning; what is essential here is that the 
Book is a strategy for evading the radical absence at the heart of language and culture. 
Blanchot writes in The Infinite Conversation: “The book: a ruse by which writing goes 
towards the absence of the book’ (IC 424). The book is a ruse, an act of cunning, whereby 
what Blanchot calls the energy (IC 425) of writing, what we describe later as desire or 
inspiration, is displaced in the Book: logocentrism is bibliocentrism. It will be the task of 
this paper to insert this crucial frame of grammatology (the history and theory of writing) 
into the question of style as a way of providing the rationale for deconstruction in relating 
the critique of metaphysics to the apparatus of literacy.  
 
As a return to grammatology Gregory Ulmer’s work in relation to what has already been 
raised as the quest for a new academic writing or new theory of poetics original text 
Applied Grammatology offers, TODAY, great support. That is, applied grammatology 
insists upon a distinction between deconstruction and grammatology. This is helpful for 
Ulmer because his invention with deconstruction was to “reread Derrida’s oeuvre from a 
perspective that turns attention away from an exclusive concern with deconstruction”. To 
get beyond what even Derrida suggested as the hype of deconstruction as stated by Ulmer 
in Applied Grammatology (we could elaborate on the time of this saying but I would 
suggest this would return it to a Levinasian said of the proper of any notion of a “today”) 
and sign Derrida’s deconstruction in the name of grammatology otherwise than proper. 
That is Grammatology for Ulmer is to quote “a more inclusive notion, embracing both 
deconstruction and “writing” (understood not only in the special sense of textualist 
écriture, but also in the sense of compositional practice). Deconstruction and Writing are 
complementary operations. Writing is privileged in Ulmer’s study, as he suggests “in 
order to explore the relatively neglected “affirmative” (Derrida’s term) dimension of 
grammatology, the practical extension of deconstruction into decomposition.  It is both 
the affirmative and decompositional elements of writing’s relation to grammatology 
although here attempted through readings of experimental texts by Derrida and signed 
otherwise to restricted propriety that guide our aims as previously stated in making the 
question of sexual difference a grammatological one. 
 
Further, Ulmer has suggested, “Western metaphysics, that is, is a synonym for “literacy.” 
Heidegger himself rarely acknowledges this frame, acting at times as if the pre-Socratic 
philosophers invented “thought” out of some pure moment at which nature (physis) 
revealed itself, when the fact is that physis (and the categories created to name it) is an 
emergent effect of writing.” However, as we know, Derrida is indebted to Heidegger’s 
“destruction” in relation to the question of language to the metaphysical truth. If our 
question here is on style we need also to acknowledge Heidegger’s own experimentations 
with writing (see Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning). In this important but 
unreadable attempt, in which he tried to follow his insights into poetry as the “other 
beginning” of Western thought, Heidegger recognized that not just certain terms, but 
 5 
every word in the dictionary is a concept. Western metaphysics, and ontology 
specifically, is in the first instance the classification system of literacy as an apparatus 
(technology, institutional practices, identity formation and so on). Philosophy, in other 
words, is to literacy what ritual is to orality. There is no “end” to metaphysics, but only 
another metaphysics, native to the emerging apparatus of post-literate technologies. 
Heidegger’s insight was that his philosophy of transition out of literacy required some 
compromises. His advice was to follow the lesson of Heraclitus, to write after the manner 
of the oracle of Delphi, which was neither to show nor conceal, but to intimate (not 
inspection, but circumspection).  
 
Derrida’s own work pushes to the extreme this circumspection by taking from the 
materials of language and rhetoric an extraordinarily evocative quality of thought. Whilst 
this paper draws on some of what can be conventionally classified as some of his most 
poetical works, certainly his most experimental texts (such as Cinders, Glas, Spurs, The 
Post Card, etc) all of his writing reveals a rigour with respect to a style of circumspection 
that activates its scenes of textual controversy. That deconstruction must be performed in 
order to be comprehended makes a question of its styles (there is never only one) as they 
shift face according to the con-textual sites located in each work, an ongoing demand for 
the reader. In this framing of style via a revisitation today of grammatology I aim to 
reveal the relevancy of style as the post-metaphysical response of deconstruction. Further 
to activate the question of style, as has Ulmer, as the other to the proper of academic 
writing firmly in the grasp of what he has pointed to as the category system of the 
alphabetic apparatus otherwise known as metaphysics. As suggested in the preamble, this 
paper folds in the ethico-political-poetics of Maurice Blanchot as a way of an approach to 
the ethics of style activated in deconstruction via both Blanchot and Emmanuel Levinas 
(the latter’s ethics being implicit in the former’s work). In this sense style 
grammatologically framed brings a question of the ethical and political into poetics. But 
first to the question of the proper through Heidegger’s thinking on belonging as we return 
to the scene of Spurs and its contemporaneity. 
 
Return 1—The improper proper of belonging [The paper does a series of returns although 
we only get today to hear about the first with the rest having already been alluded to] 
 
My focus returns to the notion of belonging in Gallop’s statement, which I will refresh: 
“like the feminism with which it was contemporary, Spurs belongs [italics mine MOC] to 
the era [1970s feminism] of ‘woman’.” Our emphasis here on the word belonging of 
woman rather than the “women” who “belong” to the discourses of feminism(s), activates 
a critical otherwise thinking on the notion of the proper via Heidegger. In the Principle of 
Identity in Identity and Difference we note Heidegger’s shift in emphasis on this notion 
of belonging in its relation to the concept of together. Heidegger emphasizes the 
belonging rather than together in relation to identity, being and the same, essentially that 
the same does not co-inside with the identity of being, and that precisely because we 
emphasise belonging, it may emerge only out of the most radical encounter with what 
does not as yet belong. That is to say, our belonging as an event of identity (and not 
difference or différance) only becomes a question when we are threatened by a not-
belonging constitutive of a monolithic and metaphysical understanding of identity as self-
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presence. Feminism, it could be suggested via Gallop’s proposition, like the feminism on 
which she is looking back [70s — she classifies herself as belonging to 80s feminism] 
together with Spurs belongs to the era of “woman”. How much has it shifted in this 
respect? Perhaps the disciplines of Derrida and Feminism, in their encounter or 
confrontation, over the grounds of Spurs, for example, throw up critique, correction and 
seduction as the institutionally determinable and determined responses on behalf of 
securing the margins. Indeed, in the for and against of Derrida, in Feminism’s approach 
to the centres and margins, recourse to security in a philosophy of the margins is 
precisely to centralize the margin itself as a truth seeking, and therefore castrating move. 
Shoring up feminism with Derrida is equally the undermining of both. The spatial-
temporal logic of “for” or “against” on the question of sexual difference are both 
deconstructed by Spurs and offer an hypothesis on the grammatological entry point 
(angle) on an otherwise writing on sexual difference, style, genre, gender or what could 
never be in terms of a discourse on metaphysical existence such as ontology, a 
categorical subject. Derrida’s spurian bookends open with as I take you back to this 
paper’s opening: “The title of this lecture was to have been the question of style. 
However—it is woman who will be my subject.” (Spurs 35-7). To a proximal closing: 
“There is no such thing as a gift of Being from which there might be apprehended and 
opposed to it something like a determined gift (whether of the subject, the body, of the 
sex or other like things—so, woman, then, will not have been my subject.) (Spurs 121). 
 
 
[END PAPER HERE] 
 




[BELOW IS STUFF I COULD USE] 
The possibility of thinking sexual difference can no longer be thought through any 
disciplinary framework that simply neglects or refuses without negotiation deconstructive 
strategies for elaborating a critique of Western metaphysics, which includes both the 
philosophical tradition but also the everyday of thought and language that has structured 
our thinking on sexual difference. We would suggest this deconstructive critique begins 
with Nietzsche and Heidegger even though it is the work of Derrida that has forged its 
name “deconstruction.” Thus, with chapter four, Spurs becomes our first angle of entry 
into the textual-accounting, the ledger without return, or the taking of not-taking of 
Derrida’s textual enterprise. Spurs engages an opening of a fourth to the triumvirate of 
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Woman, who would have been both Derrida’s subject and not 
his subject.  
 
Are we, in our approach to the question of sexual difference, becoming filial to 
decontruction? Perhaps our research is nothing more, nothing less, insofar as a method of 
mimesis carries on the moving chain or network of his work as work that frustrates the 
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desire “to get to the point.”5 We may want to firstly, then, deconstruct this notion of what 
it is to follow Derrida, i.e., to be a good, loyal “subject.” We emphasise, in our reading of 
“ATVM” in chapter six, the necessary relations between the double stricture of 
deconstructive commentary and interpretation as a necessary incoherence and betrayal for 
opening a text’s repressed meanings. Derrida here emphasises the complicity of fidelity 
and betrayal as response and responsibility to the other, as a non-return of what is given 
to encounter. This would coincide with an impossible saturation of context as closure of 
meaning necessitating decision with respect to a question of meaning and the activation 
of contingency, accident and errancy, through which the non-intentional may be 
disseminated through discourse.6 Derrida suggests in Monolingualism of the Other that 
one must “invent in your own language if you can or want to hear mine; invent if you can 
or want to give my language to be understood.”7  
 
Are we suggesting more than just a mimetic method? It would be a peculiar mimesis, one 
that emphasized betrayal, grafting, parasitical hosting and supplementarity, a mimesis of 
the blanks emphasized in Dissemination’s “Double Session.”8 The above quote implies 
that a faithful interpretation of him is one that goes beyond Derrida. He installs invention 
as a necessary component of any deconstructive reading. And yet we have recourse to 
quote him verbatim precisely on the question of moving from/to him in another invented 
language. Are any of our readings of the four texts deconstructions? This would suggest 
that deconstruction is a style, method or procedure, that something is or is not 
deconstructive. If Derrida once had recourse to an architectural metaphor to say the 
meaning of deconstruction, as the “trembling of the keystone” in the arch, not in order to 
bring down the structure but in order to locate the moment of structural stability as the 
most fragile moment, then deconstruction is an each-time engagement with assuredness, 
decisiveness, the naturalization of meaning, even within the texts of Derrida, and perhaps 
most pertinently within the texts of Derrida.  Again, this is elaborated in chapter six with 
respect to the impossibility for knowing those precise moments where one leaves the 
order of commentary and moves into a more “violent” interpretative phase, where one 
moves from inspecting the arch to soliciting it, trembling it in order to locate the 
keystone. It is precisely on this notion of not separating out the readings that makes it 
impossible to actually speak of a “work” of deconstruction. That is, there is no neat 
border crossing between his text and my text. It is the reader who signs the author’s 
name, each time giving a text its propriety, authority, proper belonging to a community of 
questioning. We will also shortly come to speak of these undecidable borders in relation 
to the supplementary logic that performs its chiasmic path across the collection of these 
texts.  
 
Methods 3: Grand Styles — Textual-accounting & the Taking of Not-Taking 
 
                                                
5  Dissemination, op. cit., p. xvi. 
6 See also Derrida, “Signature Event Context” in idem, Margins of Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass (Sussex: 
The Harvester Press, 1982) pp. 307-330. 
7 Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other or the Prosthesis of Origin, trans. by Patrick Mensah (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998) p. 57. 
8  See Disseminations, op. cit. pp. 173-286 but also “The Filial Inscription” in Plato’s Pharmacy, pp. 84-94. 
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Turnover: The “ethical” movement of writing and reading deconstructively comes from a 
reading that is not conventionally about, for instance, summing up a text’s themes, 
affirmations and so on nor looking at the biographical details of an author’s life outside 
the text. There is no outside to the text, as we emphasise in chapter seven with respect to 
the strategies of Glas. Rather, deconstructive reading is an impropriety to the authority of 
a text and in this sense is the imposition of the improper to any author, through activating 
precisely that which is out of control in the controlled forces of an authorial propriety 
(and its weakness) of language. In our own textual economy the attempt is for a reading 
both forceful and weak without hierarchy, without return. In the following ledger of 
stylistic strategies we wish to reveal our motivation for the thetic approach. 
Deconstructions latch on to a writer’s motivations at times forcefully and playfully but 
always (one hopes) for the movement of productive critical reading, which is to say to 
question the question of a community of questionableness. Our motivations, our 
intentions, perhaps our willing or our needs, are stating themselves always paradoxically, 
contradictorily, argumentatively, passively, obtusely. They are always intertwined with 
the other’s text which we sign and a textual economy of otherness that is beyond 
comprehension, truth as correctness, presence or saturation of meaning. Our stylistic 
ledger is somehow meant to account for a methodology that we are as yet still not able to 
name: 9  
 
 
Return 3—Blanchot’s politico-ethical-poetics 
 
Blanchot asks, in the name of the community, whether it is better to remain silent 
on what has been almost impossible to speak of without default, that is, its 
contemporaneous purpose. In responding, Blanchot gives and obliges his reader to 
not answering and at that very moment to not remaining silent. But, rather, to 
choose words exactingly that discover a politico-ethical poetics: “That [it] does not 
permit us to lose interest in the present time which, by opening unknown spaces of 
freedom, make us responsible for new relationships, always threatened, always 
hoped for, between what we call work, oeuvre, and what we call unworking, 
désoeuvrement” (The Unavowable Community). 
 
Part of the aim of this paper is to unpack this quote whereby relations between Blanchot’s 
poetics and temporality, sites of the unknown and ethics, work and worklessness activate 
a relation of self to the other as his unavowable or dissolute community. This is not the 
community fosters by metaphysics but as I previously mentioned, is the community of 
writing; of poetics; artists; that speak otherwise through a desire that speaks a 
Blanchotian nothing or radical absence in language and culture, to the traditional 
academic model of the disciplinary. Blanchot’s community I would suggest here that 
those exacting words that open up unknown spaces of freedom that make us responsible 
for new relationships come from the place of the other. An other I suggest is within us 
already in the sense of a Levinasian and Derridean ethics; that comes before us and 
reduces the self to an infinite otherwise knowing of-its-self. So let us assume for 
                                                
9 Deconstruction as a dual “methodology” a double gesture of reading and writing, double science, is also a 
deconstruction of the notion of methodology with respect to the ideal of an methodological strategy that 
consists of an observer being absolutely exterior to the object, text etc being examined. 
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expedience sake for the time of this presentation that both Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics 
and Jacques Derrida’s impossible or unconditional gift underpins the thinking for reading 
Blanchot’s site of politico-ethical poetics. These poetics that come from the place of 
otherness, are exacting in their strangeness and we do not choose them in the sense of a 
rational and predetermined choice but rather they speak us. In this paper, I aim to show 
that these words are more than spoken or written and can be contextualized further as the 
incomplete or infinite artwork (Blanchot’s worklessness) as Blanchot’s community that 
occur through an excess of self. I, will of course, return to this notion of excess as it 
corresponds desire with respect to Blanchot’s poetics. Blanchot’s politico-ethical poetics 
opens up the unknown present conditioned by a temporality that operates between what 
he names work (oeuvre) and unworking (désouvrement). Blanchot’s lesson for choosing 
exacting words for a discovery of literature’s politico-ethical poetics is for a concern with 
time; or what we could term a temporality of ethics that is activated through relations of 
work and worklessness activated in and through political-ethical poetics.  
 
Solitude 
Blanchot’s thinking on solitude, which begins his meditation on literature, shifts from the 
solitude of the writer in his early thought to the solitude of the work in his later writings. 
That is, solitude exists in the essential solitude of the work of language that is removed 
from the solitude of the writer alone. Or rather in language what is to remain silent is the 
solitude of the writer. The paradox here is that it is in language that the solitude of the 
writer is expressed i.e. not alone in language. Blanchot insists on this double bind where 
he, as I quote him, “is not free to be alone without expressing the fact that he is alone” 
(from Gaze of Orpheus, 4). Blanchot’s solitude can only be expressed by means of that 
which precisely denies solitude: language. The law of writing therefore is privation 
whereby its other is absence and so solitude is only solitude in relation to its otherness: 
Blanchot continues to suggest by this paradox that, to quote him, “a person who writes is 
committed to writing by the silence and the privation of language that have stricken him” 
(Gaze of Orpheus, 5).  
 
To summarise this point on solitude; the condition of possibility for literature is a certain 
silence (what Blanchot also describes as the nothing), the silence of solitude, whereby the 
writer has nothing to express. This nothing as the writer’s silent solitude is the source of 
literature that we come to know as the unavowable community or what I come to equate 
with the simple facticity of being riveted to existence without an exit (Blanchot’s essential 
night; essential solitude) but driven by an insatiable desire for the origin of the artwork: 
As Blanchot suggests, “having nothing to write, of having no means of writing it, and of 
being forced by an extreme necessity to keep writing it” (Gaze of Orpheus, 5). The 
radical incompletion of the artwork (literature), its worklessness, is its source and thus 
preserves the possibility of literature whereby this incompletion prevents the artist 
standing back from their work and saying, as Blanchot suggests in the Gaze of Orpheus, 
‘at last it is finished, at last there is nothing’ (GO 20). 
 
In the opening quote to this paper, Blanchot’s suggests a radical otherwise knowing of 
community in a performance of a political-ethical-poetics that gives the unconditional 
relation to the other as a possible way of being in today; in the contemporary.  
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Time of the Récit: a political-ethical-poetics 
 
How does Blanchot’s question of what literature is perform and otherwise poetics? If 
style is our subject how does Blanchot’s poetics escape metaphysical subjectivity? I 
would like to pursue these questions further by engaging on the site of Blanchot’s récit as 
a practice of his poetics (a saying otherwise) that can come to demonstrate more 
poignantly my concerns around a temporality of ethics in the time of his writing: A 
temporality akin to Derrida’s time-out-of-joint or différance that articulates an 
uncertainty for the future that is both excessively predetermined or predestined and never 
arrived at. Or to put it another way an arrival at the destination before even having taken 
the journey, an arrival that defers and differs from that which was imagined once. This is 
the temporality of Jacques Derrida’s différance and Blanchot’s récit. 
 
Récit: Fragments and Steps (pas, step—not): The Madness of the Day  
What time I have left I would like to focus, albeit briefly, on particularly two of 
Blanchot’s writings; the first formally a récit that hints at an end all such formality in The 
Madness of the Day. And the second; a form of criticism in The Gaze of Orpheus. What is 
this end to formality? The movement roman to récit appears initially in his two versions 
of Thomas the Obscure to the refinement and eventual disappearance of the récit; what is 
called in The Madness of the Day, the pas de récit (the one step more/no more of the 
tale), when Blanchot stops writing “fiction” altogether (or so it seems). Both Blanchot’s 
fiction and criticism reach a point where they undergo fragmentation and pass into one 
another, something that can be seen particularly acutely in The Writing of The Disaster 
(fp 1980). I would suggest that we would want to read Blanchot’s work as a movement 
toward a kind of transcendence of the distinction between fiction and criticism and form 
and content implicit in both genres. And further see it as the production of literature as its 
own theory and whose genre of expression is the fragment. This fragmentary position 
transcends comprehension in its refusal and produces an alterity irreducible to 
presentation or cognition, an alterity that can variously be named with terms already 
mentioned as in absence, the essential night, community, silent-solitude, radical passivity 
and worklessness.  In an improper fashion then we suggest that Blanchot’s récit is a site 
for excavating a Levinasian temporality of radical alterity, exteriority or infinity of an 
uncertainty for the future that is both excessively predetermined or predestined and never 
arrived — a site of the unavowable community that performs a temporality of ethics as 
Derrida’s différance or time-out-of-joint.  
 
Let us trace this temporality as the performative utterance that hides itself as it witnesses 
itself as an archive for its re-telling of a story; a future-passed (or future-anterior), 
Blanchot’s pas or step—not. What Blanchot has elsewhere described as the Yes yes10 as a 
performative utterance that implicitly marks out its temporal logic of a return to the point 
of departure only to find it has shifted, moved on as the demand for understanding, 
conceptualization, comprehension, possession of meaning would have it.  
 
                                                
 
 11 
Blanchot’s récit activates a space of literature where time breaks and another order of 
time takes not in the sense of a taking for mastery, possession or centrality for 
comprehension. But rather, a temporality of taking that expresses Blanchot’s writerly 
concern in the “form” of the récit as an exhaustion around the mere condition of 
possibility of narrative and in this same moment its impossibility. In The Madness of the 
Day the narrator recounts, that is, he gives us the possibility of narrative; a story of his 
existence that does not add up to those who see him otherwise. The other as Law of 
reason cannot understand why this man has ended up where he has, when he had so much 
promise. A promise that lay in the task of story-telling and yet contradictorily for these 
representatives of the Law, they cannot understand why a man who has such ability in 
telling cannot recount an orderly narrative of his own existence. Likewise the 
protagonist/narrator confesses this is beyond his capacity: “I had to acknowledge that I 
was not capable of forming a story out of these events. I had lost the sense of the story.” 
(Blanchot: The Madness of the Day, The Station Hill Reader, 199) Blanchot’s 
protagonist/narrator activates the impossible-possibility of narrative by frustrating the 
story; in starting it over-again at the end. That is to suggest narrative is a recounting of 
experience that knows the experience only through a retelling. Here, Augé’s self-posed-
solitude is not far from such an experience. All narratives are a rehearsal, an archiving, a 
retelling, a repetition as iteration. Narrative impossibility (and possibility) is in its 
“recounting facts that he [the writer] remembers”. The remembrance is another story in 
terms of why he might be retelling at all, which I have linked earlier, and aim to make 
stronger, to an insatiable desire for the source of the artwork as worklessness: The radical 
incompletion of the artwork (literature), its worklessness, is its source and thus preserves 
the possibility of literature whereby this incompletion prevents the artist standing back 
from their work and saying, ‘at last it is finished, at last there is nothing’ (GO 20). 
 
Blanchot’s récit enters into the space of literature where no more stories happen as they 
depart from their sense. This space of literature or Blanchot’s ethico-polical-poetics 
between the possibility and impossibility of narrative or récit activates this relation 
between work and unworking. The temporal logic (or madness) of Blanchot’s pas (step—
not) is of the story “of what never happens,” or the impossible narration that is the whole 
story of the non-story of Blanchot’s récit. This temporal pas (step-not) is conditioned by 
the impossibility for the narrative to continue too rapidly in order to give into the 
demands of a metaphysics of presence; into the clear and direct light of day.11  
                                                
11 We hint here at Maurice Blanchot’s, “Madness of the Day,” op. cit., pp. 189-200. This short récit has been 
discussed by Derrida extensively in “The Law of Genre,” and also in “Living On • Borderlines,” in relation 
to Blanchot’s Death Sentence. What for Derrida is hidden, we have suggested already, is the temporal gift of 
the not-yet, the Law’s hiddenness as abyssal difference in the story “of what never happens.” We have alluded 
to the impossible narration that is the whole story of the non-story of Blanchot’s récit, his “The Madness of 
the Day.”11 The law in Blanchot’s story appears as a feminine “silhouette” that is neither a man nor a woman 
and is a companion to the quasi-narrator who is before the law. What is impossible to narrate is the story of 
the law, an impossible story recounted and demanded by the law’s representatives (policemen, judges, 
doctors). The story recounted, that is “put forward,” as appearance, to the representatives is on the 
impossibility of recounting as correctness, as presence, and hence its impossibility. Derrida suggests this union 
of an impossible story or story as the impossibility of possibility is where literature begins. It is made 
impossible before the representatives of the Law (“language is the elementary medium of the Law”).11 This is 
the union bringing together an “I/We” of the “remarkable truth” of truth as more adventurous and risky. At 
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A belonging-not-belonging we would want to call a poetics of the self-in-ruin or in 
Blanchotian terms the site of the unavowable community of “the never-subjected subject 
as the very relation of the self to the other”: in this sense infinite or discontinuous, in this 
sense: relation always in displacement and in displacement in regard to itself, 
displacement also of that which would be without place (non-place).   
 
For Blanchot writing engages a movement towards the nothingness opened by the 
experience of dread or anxiety. Literature is an attempt at saying nothing; dread is 
nothing that can be expressed and yet the only thing that causes me to desire expression, 
writing is useless and yet nothing is more serious. We must return to the theme of 
solitude to make clear that Blanchot’s freedom or autonomy of the writer in the privation 
of language “is not free to be alone without expressing the fact that he is alone” (from 
Gaze of Orpheus, 4) is an autonomy that can never achieve complete self-identity through 
the alterity of the artwork. Blanchot makes the distinction between essential solitude and 
the solitude in the world (Space of Literature, 251-53). Essential solitude is not the 
worldly, artistic solitude as in the mythic artists alone. Such solitude for Blanchot is 
existential solipsism, which is self-relation or self-communion. Rather, the essential 
solitude is that of the Work, a solitude upon which the writer is dependent but to which 
he necessarily has a self-deceptive relationship, mistaking the Work for the Book he 
writes etc. This is in short is a totalized view of the artwork. This is what is at stake in 
The Gaze of Orpheus between law of the artwork and the lawlessness of desire that 
                                                
that point it would be a truth without end, abyssal, as random drift. Yet, more significantly, it is the “I/We” not 
of its representatives, but of the law herself who, throughout a récit, forms a couple with me, with the “I” of 
the narrative voice.11  Further, as we know not what or who the law is, as in the neutrality of its non-gendering, 
the law opens up the impossible “atopology” that annuls oppositions:  
The law is silent, and of it nothing is said to us. Nothing, only its name, its common name 
and nothing else. In German it is capitalized, like a proper name. We do not know what it 
is, who it is, where it is. Is it a thing, a person, a discourse, a voice, a document, or simply a 
nothing that incessantly defers access to itself, thus forbidding itself in order thereby to 
become something or someone?11 
 “Before the Law,” op. cit., p. 206. However, “the fictitious nature of this ultimate story which robs us of 
every event, of this pure story, or story without story, has as much to do with philosophy, science, or 
psychoanalysis as with literature.”  (ibid.).  “The Law of Genre,” op. cit., p. 249.  The law is being made by 
both the “I” and “We” coming to light in the madness of the day where the one who brings forth law to the 
light of day is given by the “I” of the writer as also “author of the law.” (ibid., p. 250.) This union’s 
singular act is eventing before institutional, academic law engenders the law: “There is no general device. 
In some situations you have to behave in a very conservative way, in tough conservative ways, to maintain, 
and at the same time or the day after to do exactly the contrary.” (“Women in the Beehive,” op. cit., p. 
155.) But also: “He who engenders her, he, her mother who no longer knows how to say “I” or to keep 
memory intact. I am the mother of law, behold my daughter’s madness. It is also the madness of the day, 
for day, the word day in its disseminal abyss, is law, the law of the law. My daughter’s madness is to want 
to be born—like anybody and nobody [comme personne]. Whereas she remains a “silhouette,” a shadow, a 
profile, her face never in view.” (“The Law of Genre,” op. cit., p. 250.)For Derrida, the temporal gift of the 
“Not-Yet” (the Law’s hiddenness as abyssal difference in the story “of what never happens,” or the 
impossible narration that is the whole story of the non-story of Blanchot’s récit or “The Madness of the 
Day”) is an affirmative excess and not a sacrifice. (ibid.) This hiddenness as abyssal difference 
(interminable différance) as the affirmative quality of the Law, we will come to name as the madness of the 
law. And it will be her who comes. 
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exceeds this totalisation of Work. What is clearly mistaken in Orpheus’ gaze is the 
relation between the work and the capital W-Work as a totalized form. To skip rather 
rapidly over the story: It is — the moment when Orpheus turns around to look at 
Eurydice in the night, as the night he transgresses the law (of the underworld) through the 
movement of desire. Desire as I’ve suggested for Blanchot is always in excess of the law. 
Orpheus’ desire is not to see Eurydice in the daylight, in the beauty of a completed 
aesthetic form that has submitted to the passage by way of the law of concealment, but 
rather to see her in the night, as the hear of the night prior to daylight, ‘her body closed, 
her face sealed’ (GO 100). Orpheus does not want to make the invisible visible, but rather 
(and impossibly) to see the invisible as invisible. Orpheus’ ‘mistake’, as it were, lies in 
the nature of his desire, which desires to see Eurydice when he is only destined to sing 
about her. He loses her through his desire and is forced to forgo both his art — his song 
— and his dream of a happy life. The paradox of Orpheus’ situation is that if he did not 
turn his gaze on Eurydice he would be betraying his desire and thus would cease to be an 
artist.  Thus, the desire which destroys his art is also its source. 
 
The ambiguous zone of source and destruction or the work’s failure by now should be 
easy to locate with Blanchot’s notion of work and worklessness. Orpheus’ gaze traces out 
this ambiguity that we have attempted to locate or at least open up in the space of double-
gap between a knowing self and self-in-excess through our ethical relation to the other. 
What we have suggested as a temporality of ethics activated in the politico-ethical poetics 
of Blanchot. In what possesses the self in this excessive zone of retelling, rehearsal, 
acting-out of self is the gaze of the other from which our poetic-desire is sourced and 
exceeds ourselves. And further, what drives us to keep producing “new” work whether 
this be the constant retelling of ourselves in our posed-solitude, is what Blanchot terms 
community or the “other night” that is “a dying stronger than death in our self riveted to 
existence. This energy and desire of worklessness or ‘the other night’ always works 
against the law of metaphysical truth fueled by energy of the lawlessness of writing’s 
desire as primodiality of difference. Blanchot’s le mourir (or other night) is the stronger 
night that gives the origin of the writer’s experience in the impossible experience to 
control one’s death. Rather this origin is something stronger than death, namely the 
simple facticity of being riveted to existence without an exit. The desire that governs 
Blanchot’s work has its source elsewhere from the dialectical movement of self-
consciousness. This experience of le mourir, the essential night, where one cannot find a 





Why are there so few readings on these four Derrida texts by women, or men for that 
matter, included in our work? We have mentioned both Chanter and Sandford already 
with explicit reference to our reading of “ATVM.” What is it to suggest a moment of 
“originality,” already deconstructed as an archive-effect, which would come from 
stepping beyond the proper boundaries for cultivating a deeper enquiry into the unknown 
of sexual differences. If not “originality,” then invention or eventing as an opening to a 
possibility that has eschewed the technique of conscious exclusion of what would be 
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otherwise than that which Heidegger would suggest as the “present-at-handness” of 
“woman”. This becomes for this writer an ethico-politico-poetics of responsibility to 
feminism and its others, the other feminisms yet to come or become recognizable. This 
ethico-politico-poetics of responsibility extends to deconstruction and its law for an 
otherwise logic to the binary metaphysical oppositional thinking of “man” and “woman.” 
We have by now exhausted this question of propriety and yet we feel a necessity to 
suggest that for all our impropriety we end our thesis with, perhaps, the most ontic and 
accessible engagement on the question of sexual difference in our bringing together 
deconstruction and feminism. Is this our default, our betrayal of our betrayal, which 
would then be fidelity to our non-fidelity? You might want to consider in your 
assessment, adjudication or judgement of our faults what we say on the matter in relation 
to the logic of the fault discussed in chapter six. Are we still in debt? Have we returned 
toward another scene of reserve? Then again, a reserve is also an enclosed and partitioned 
property, often set aside for non-productive ends, also in some places called a close. 
 
The Möbius strip is a powerful figuration of the economy, of the law of 
reappropriation, or of successful mourning-work that can no longer, in the 
writing of Glas, toll a knell {sonner un glas} which is its own (its glas) 
without breakage {bris} and debris. The debris of this band is not even the 
last or the first; it repeats and scatters the debris of a bris de verre {glass 
breakage} or of a mirror {glace}, and it has a multiple occurrence in the 
book (impossible to count them: it is always, at least, once again a piece of 
the name of Jean Genet’s mother: Gabrielle, of my name, of all the 
numerous brilliant objects and words, or of that which bridles and unbridles 
the horse and the “cavalier phantasm” of the genet, the Spanish horse that 
plays a very important role in all of this {ça}—the last words are “debris 
de,” of all the dé, dés {die, dice, or sewing thimbles}, dais {dais, or canopy} 
[for example “dais de l’oeil révulsé” {canopy of the upturned eye}—12  
 
                                                
12  Derrida, “Ja, or the faux-bond II” in Points … Interviews, 1974–1994, ed. by Elisabeth 
Weber, trans. by Peggy Kamuf & others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) pp. 51-52. 
 
 
